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FATALITIES IN AIRCRAFT CRASHESA CONTRACTUAL BASIS OF RECOVERY?
BY KENT J. CLANCY
Northwestern University, School of Law
N an effort to avoid the monetary limitations of certain wrongful death
statutes,1 the plaintiffs in a number of recent suits involving airplane
crashes have proceeded in the courts on the theory that the resulting death
of passengers constituted a breach of the contract of safe carriage by the
2
carrier, for which a cause of action properly lay. In rejecting this theory,
the courts have not given it the careful consideration which it merits. This
article shall attempt to make the type of analysis which is warranted.
STATUS OF PRESENT LAW-ANALYSIS OF THE LEADING CASE

The contractual theory of recovery was first advanced in Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.3 A Boston-bound plane which had taken off from New
York City crashed in Connecticut. The plaintiff, administrator of the estate
of one of the deceased passengers, alleging that the ticket constituted a
contract of safe carriage, sought recovery under the New York wrongful
death act, 4 which did not limit liability, since the ticket was purchased
within that state. The carrier contended, however, that since the injuries
and the death occurred in Connecticut, the law of that forum was controlling,5 and the amount of plaintiff's recovery was limited by the Connecticut
wrongful death statute. 6 Plaintiff's motion to strike the interposed defense
was denied by the court, which ruled :7
...Although they [the causes of action] are couched in contract language, it is obvious that liability, if any, will be predicated upon proof of
negligence. Where, as here, the gravamen of the cause of action is an
alleged breach of a duty through negligence, the action is governed by the
applicable law of torts, even though the allegations refer to a breach of
contract.
The principal case relied upon by the Faron court to justify its looking
at the gist of the action and determining that defendant's liability, if any,
must arise from its negligence and hence was governed by tort law, was
Loehr v. East Side Omnibus Corp.8 The court in Blessington v. McCrory
Stores Corp.,9 however, modified the effect of the Loehr case. In speaking
of the Loehr case and similar cases, the Blessington court said :10
The particular reasoning of those cases [Webber v. Herkimer; Loehr
v. East Side Omnibus; Hermes v. Westchester Racing Assn., 213 App.
Div. 147 (1925)] applies only to instances where the alleged breach of
contract is failure to use due care-in other words, negligence. Since the
common law duty and the implied contractual obligation, in such situations, are one and the same, the suit however labeled, is one in negligence,
at least for time limitation purposes. (Italics added)
Although the italicized phrase appears to limit the effect of the Loehr decision, or at least question its extension for other reasons, the court in Faron
ignored the phrase and cited the Loehr case as holding that where the gist
of the action is negligence, the action is controlled by tort law.
The Faron decision is the cornerstone upon which a series of other cases2
1
They have held, with one exception,'
have rejected the contract theory.
that there is no contractual action for death in airplane crashes.
NOTE: Footnotes follow end of article on pages 265-267.
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PATTERSON V. AMERICAN AIRLINES: AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE

In Patterson v. American Airlines, a case arising out of the crash in
New Jersey of a flight that had originated in New York, plaintiff sued on
a theory of breach of contract and one of tort under both the New Jersey
wrongful death 13 and survival 14 acts. The court denied defendant's motion
to dismiss the claims based on breach of contract, holding that the applicable
law was that of the forum where the crash occurred, and that a contractual
action would lie under both the statutes. 15
The defendant in Patterson advanced the Faron and Maynard cases to
support its motion to dismiss. The court, because of the lack of New Jersey
precedent, considered the law of New York, with emphasis on the reasoning
of the Faron and Maynard cases. The court concluded that the authorities
upon which those cases were decided were cases which involved the issue
of whether the contract or tort statute of limitations should apply, and thus
were not necessarily controlling as to the issue before it.
The "Patterson" conclusion was also reached under New York law in
Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital. 6 The cause of action in this case
arose when a child, while under the care of the hospital, was fatally burned
from contact with steam pipes on the hospital premises. The court, finding
that the hospital had entered into a contract with the child's mother for her
was a sufficient complaint
safe and reasonable care, held that its breach
17
under the New York wrongful death statute.
Since the Patterson and St. John's cases were decided under statute,
however, they cannot be cited as supporting a "common law" contractual
action for the victims of an airplane crash. They are still important, however, in the development of the "common law" contract theory, since they
have recognized the existence of a breach of contract action where the gist
of the action is a breach of duty through negligence. The Faron and Maynard decisions, which were also decided under a New York law, which
recognizes the survival of contract actions, could thus have been decided
differently. In any event, the courts' cursory treatment of the problem was
highly unwarranted.
The common thread which runs through the decisions of most of the
courts which have considered the contract theory is that negligence means
tort. However, negligence is not synonymous with tort. Negligence is merely
a method whereby a duty is violated or breached. If the duty is imposed by
contract the negligent breach is not a tort. It would only be so if the duty
is one imposed by law., If a contract is breached through negligence, a
proper remedy is in contract, as shown by the Patterson case. The reason
why courts have consistently equated negligence with tort remains a mystery.
SURVIVAL OF A CONTRACT ACTION: AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER STATUTE

Contract actions generally survive at common law, while tort actions do
not.' 8 This rule is further refined, however, in that contract breaches which
result in personal injuries to the decedent abate upon the death of the party
who would have been entitled to sue on the contract, while those resulting in
damages to his estate, or a benefit to another party, survive. 19 Thus it
would appear that in most cases a plaintiff in a suit such as those under
consideration would have a valid common law contract cause of action.
Many American jurisdictions, however, have enacted "survival

stat-

utes,"'20 which either merely codify the common law or modify it. For example, an action for death usually survives to the estate of the decedent under
these statutes, while it did not do so at common law. 2' These statutes, with
some exceptions,= are interpreted in light of the common law distinction
between contractual breaches which result in injuries to the person and

those which result in injuries to his estate. Thus, in the absence of specific
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statutory language to the contra, it is felt that a contract cause of action
should be recognized under such statutes. If this were done, there would
be no question of plaintiff's right to seek a contract recovery.
A CHOICE OF ACTIONS: GENERAL DENIAL BY COURTS
Even where it appears that there is a contractual action as well as a
tort action, the courts are loath to give plaintiff his choice, at least where
28
the action is one to recover for the death of a person.
Although most courts have held that an action under the wrongful death
statutes cannot be predicated upon a breach of contract, 24 the language of
many of these statutes could certainly be readily open to a construction
which would allow a contractual action, 25 and since they are intended to be
remedial in nature, they should be interpreted broadly. 26 It should be noted,
however, that if the cause of action is given to the decedent's wife, the fact
that she is not a party to the contract will present a real problem. While a
theory of third party beneficiary might be used in this instance, its application is, at best, far-fetched. One of the reasons often given by the courts
taking this limiting view is that the duty imposed on common carriers by
the contract is no higher than the duty imposed on them by law as a matter
of public policy, and since the duty would exist even without the contract
the action is properly a tort rather than contractual one. However, this in
itself should not be determinative, for it appears that the state would not
impose such a duty if it were not for the contractual relationship between
the parties, 27 nor does it adequately support their action in dismissing the
contractual obligations which would exist in spite of the public policy
obligations. If the duty imposed by the contract were less than the publicly
imposed duty under tort law, one might be able to argue that the contract
is void as being contrary to the public interest. This is not the case, however, and therefore unless the legislators have specifically precluded private
contract obligations, they should be recognized by the courts since they do
not in any way oppose the public interest.
CONCLUSIONS
Uncertainty is the prevailing note in aviation accident law. An injured
passenger's welfare is at the mercy of a maze of legal rules and procedures
which vary considerably between the states and which often result in inadequate redress for his wrongs. 28 The publication of this fact before the
general public
has led to a greater concern for some simplification of the
29
situation.
To allow a contractual basis of recovery would be a step in this direction. By the passenger knowing the monetary limitations of recovery, if
any, in the State in which he purchased his ticket, he can determine whether
the purchase of additional insurance is warranted. He fails to have this
opportunity now since he rarely knows which states the aircraft will pass
over during his journey.
From the standpoint of the airlines, the court's approval of a contract
action would possibly lead to larger damage awards against them wherein
the contractual action could be used to avoid the monetary limitations of
certain states. This potential increase in monetary liability however, might
be justified on at least two bases:
1. Since the carrier 'has entered into a contract and has profited thereby,
it should also entertain the liability of such a contract.
2. The interest of the state in providing protection for its residents or
travelers using its transportation facilities and in seeing that they
have adequate remedies for wrongs done to them. The interest of
the state in which the contract is made appears more valid than
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that of the state where an accident occurs, since that state's contacts
with the aggrieved parties is often fortuitous and results merely
from use of their airspace.
Therefore, it is suggested that the contract theory has a sound basis in
law and policy and deserves greater consideration by the courts.
EDrroas' NoTE: As this article went to press the New York Court of Appeals, on January 12,
1961. rendered a decision in respect to the plaintiff's appeal in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines (see
note 7 of preceding article). The court affirmed the Appellate Division's dismissal of the complaint based on breach of contract holding that the suit was one in tort for negligently causing
death and as such was subject to the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. The majority opinion, however, was not confined solely to the breach of contract theory, the singular issue
appealed, but to the consternation of three members of the court, it contained extensive dicta
in respect to the plaintiff's alternate cause of action based on the Massachusetts statute. It was
found by the majority of the court that the plaintiff, although bound by the Massachusetts
statute on substantive issues, was not bound by the monetary limitations within that statute
since this was a procedural issue to be resolved by the law of the forum wherein the action was
litigated. Since such limitations were against the public policy of the State of New York and
since there was ample judicial precedence for holding such limitations inapplicable in a situation such as this, the plaintiff was given the right to apply for leave to amend his alternate
cause of action accordingly.
AUTHOR's NoTE: The court's handling of the breach of contract issue Is typical of the inadequate treatment mentioned in my article. As to the court's dicta on the monetary limitation
issue, it would appear, at first reading and with little time to explore the court's theory thoroughly, that if such dicta becomes law, plaintiff's in New York and in those states adopting a
similar view will not resort to a breach of contract cause of action since the need for so doing
has been extinguished. The theory, however, will still have great vitality in those jurisdictions
which subscribe to what appears to be the more universally accepted views of two dissenting
justices on this issue.

FOOTNOTES
1 American courts have uniformly accepted the statement of Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493 at 495 (1808) that "In a civil court the
death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury."
England remedied this situation by passage of the Fatal Accidents Act of
1846, 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, more popularly known as Lord Campbell's Act. It
provided, in part:
"That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would,
(if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an
action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such
case the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of a person
injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony."
All American jurisdictions have enacted similar legislation. The U.S. statutes
are generally of two types: "death" statutes which are said to create a cause of

action for the survivors of the decedent; and "survival" statutes, which provide
that the decedent's cause of action will survive to his estate. An example of the

former type is the Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, 1, 2 (1959) ; an example
of the latter type is N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-3 (1952).
For a more general discussion of the history of such legislation and the

manner in which the statutes have been interpreted, see Prosser, Torts 710 (2d
ed. 1955).
Fourteen of the wrongful death statutes impose a limit of from $20,000 to
$30,000 on the amount of damages recoverable: Colorado, $25,000, Colo. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 41-1-3 (1953); Connecticut, $25,000, Conn. Gen. Stat., Rev. § 52-555

(Supp. 1958) ; Illinois, $30,000, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70,,§§ 1, 2 (1959); Kansas,
$25,000, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-3203 (1949); Maine, $20,000, Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. ch. 165, § 10 (1954); Massachusetts, $20,000, Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 229,

I 6E (1955); Minnesota, $25,000, Minn. Stat. Ann., § 573.02 (1947); Missouri,
25,000, Vernons Ann. Mo. Stat., § 537.090

(1949);

New

Hampshire, $25,000,

N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 556:13 (1955); Oregon, $20,000, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.020
(1959); South Dakota, $20,000, S. D. Code, § 37.2203

(1939);

Virginia, $30,000,

Va. Code Ann., § 8-636 (1950); West Virginia, $20,000, W. Va. Code of 1955 Ann.

§ 5475; Wisconsin, $25,000, Wis. Stat. Ann., § 331.04 (1958).

On the other hand, personal injury suits, when brought under the common
law often result in damage awards in excess of $100,000. See Ratner v. Arrington,
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959) [airplane collision, $198,339].
2 Recent actions against plane manufacturers have also been based on the
theory of breach of an implied warranty of the fitness of the plane to carry
passengers safely. This theory has been accepted by some courts. See, e.g., Siegel v.
Braniff Airways, 6 Av. Cas., 17,978 (S.D.N.Y.,

1960); and, Conlon v. Republic

Aviation Corp., 6 Av. Cas. 17,982 (S.D.N.Y., 1960).
3 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 568 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1948).
4 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law, see. 130 (1949).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
5 The court in the Faron case cited the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 391
(1934), which states: "The law of the place of wrong governs the right of action
for death." Sec. 377 defines the "place of wrong" thusly: "The place of wrong is
in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place." [Italics added.]
The relevant sections of the Restatement dealing with contractual actions, secs.
337, 346, and 358, indicate that the governing law is that of the state where the
contract was entered into. Sec. 337 deals specifically with contracts of carriage,
providing that: "When passengers or goods are accepted for carriage pursuant
to a contract, the law of the place of contracting determines the duties of the
carrier."
Another conflicts of laws theory applicable to contract actions is "center of
gravity," which theorizes that the applicable conflict law is that of the forum
having the most to do with all aspects of the problem involved. Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 1955, 124 N.E. 2nd 99 (1954). This theory was rejected in an aviation
fatality action on the basis that the action was one in tort, and the "center of
gravity" theory was inapplicable in tort law. Riley, Admx. v. Capital Airlines,
Inc., 6 Av. Cas., 18,159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe County, 1960).
6 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-555 (1958).
7 84 N.Y.S. 2d at 570.
The Second Circuit, in Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, 178 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir.
1949), a suit arising out of the same crash, relied on the Faron case in coming
to a similar conclusion. This case is of particular interest, however, since that
court dismissed Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871), as not controlling. The
Dyke court had held that a plaintiff who purchased a train ticket between two
points in New York and was injured while the train was passing through a small
portion of Pennsylvania, had a right to sue for his injuries under the common law
of New York, since the contract of carriage was entered into in that state. The
plaintiff was thus able to avoid the Pennsylvania statute which limited the liability
of common carriers for injuries to passengers to $3,000. The court in Maynard
felt that the Dyke case lacked vitality and was irreconcilable with later decisions,
and hence dismissed it as not controlling.
One such decision which the Maynard court felt was irreconcilable was Caroll
v. Staten Island R. Co., 58 N.Y. 126, (1884), where the plaintiff sued for injuries
he received as the result of a boiler explosion on the ferry boat carrying him as a
passenger. The defendant contended that the action was based on breach of contract, and that the contract was illegal, as a statute prohibited travel for pleasure
on Sunday and plaintiff was admittedly traveling for pleasure on Sunday. The
court found, however, that the action was one based on negligence, and hence need
not depend on the validity of the contract of carriage. The case is not irreconcilable with the Dyke decision as contended by the Maynard court, however, since
the issue of a contract action was never decided by the court.
In Webber v. Herkimer & M. St. R. Co., 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358 (1888),
an action for injury to a passenger on a street railway, the issue involved was
whether plaintiff's claim was barred by the tort statute of limitations or whether
it was timely under the applicable contract statute of limitations. The court held
that the action was one in negligence, and hence governed by the tort statute of
limitations.
In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 6 Av. Cas. 17,988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App.
Div., 1960), the court considered the Dyke case differently. The court distinguished
the Dyke case from the wrongful death action under consideration on the basis
that it was a personal injury suit. The court, apparently feeling that the distinction was self-explanatory, made no effort to point out its importance. It appears
that the only important distinction that one can arrive at is that the applicable
statute in the Kilberg case created the cause of action and without such a statute
no cause of action would exist for death, whereas in the case of personal injury
the cause of action would be predicated on the contract or on tort law without any
reliance on a statute.
This distinction is not necessarily valid, for a contract action, under specific
conditions, does survive at common law, and certain wrongful death statutes and
survival statutes can be broadly interpreted to provide for a contractual basis
of recovery. See text and footnotes to follow in this article.
8 259 App. Div. 200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1940). Plaintiff, a paying
passenger on an omnibus, was injured when the conductor refused to permit her
to disembark.
9 305 N.Y. 140 (1953). A child was burned to death when a cowboy suit
purchased at defendant's store caught fire. Suit was brought for the child's pain
and suffering, not for his wrongful death under section 130. It was held that the
action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for use was timely and was not
barred by the tort statute of limitations.
10 305 N.Y. at 147-148.
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11 Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 178 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir., 1949); Herman
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.Y., 1957); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y., 1960); Snow v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y., 1959); Bannister v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
6 Av. Cas. 17,688 (E.D.N.Y., 1959); Riley, Admx. v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 6 Av.
Cas. 18,159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe County, 1960); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 6 Av. Cas. 17,988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1960).
12 Patterson v. American Airlines, Inc., 3 Av. Cas. 18,214 (S.D.N.Y., 1953).
13 N. J. Stat. Ann., § 2A: 31-1 (1952).
14 N. J. Stat. Ann., § 2A: 15-3 (1952).
15 It should be noted that the action was brought under the statutes of New
Jersey, the state where the crash occurred, not the state where the flight originated.
16 96 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y.S. 401, aff'd 176 App. Div. 885, 161 N.Y.S. 1143 (Sup.
Ct., App. Div., 1916).
17 N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, sec. 130 (1949).
18 3 Holdswortb, History of English Law, 3d ed. (1923).
19 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival § 137; 1 Am. Jur., Abatement and Revival

§ 85.

20

(1950).

See, e.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A: § 15-3 (1952) ; N. C. Gen. Stat., § 28-172

21 However, this is often interpreted to be subject to the limitation that the
decedent must have survived for a period of time after the complained of injury.
Because instantaneous death often results in airplane crash cases, this last
requirement often results in no action surviving, even under the statute.
The theory is that since the action survives the death of decedent, it must
have vested in him while he was living. See, e.g., Micks v. Norton, 256 Mich. 308,
239 N.W. 512 (1931); and Royal Indemnity Co. v. Pittsfield Electric Co., 293
Mass. 4, 199 N.E. 69 (1935).
22 Stewart v. Lee, 70 N.H. 181, 46 Atl. 31, (1900) and Winnegar's Admr. v.
Central Passenger Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 547, 4 S.W. 237, (1887) [carriage of passenger
on street railway], are actions in which it was held that contracts involving personal injuries to the decedent, as opposed to those to his estate, survived under
the statutes.
23 Where the action is not for wrongful death the courts are more liberal.
See, e.g., Lee's Admr. v. Hill, 87 Va. 497, 12 S.E. 1052 (1891), [plaintiff had his
choice of actions and could sue in contract for wrongful discharge of his decedent,
so that the contract survived]; 5 Corbin, Contracts, § 1019 at 104-105 (1951) :
If the plaintiff has stated and proved facts that constituted both a tort
and a breach of contract, he may have an election between the two different measures of recovery; but there is no necessity for requiring him to
make an election between them since he can choose the more advantageous
one without injustice to the defendant.
24 Revel v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co., 238 Ill. App. 4 (1925), aff'd Revel
v. Butler, 322 Ill. 337, 153 N.E. 682 (1926); Willey v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n,
9 F. 2d 937 (N.D. Cal., 1925). Contra, Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 165
N.W. 237 (1917); Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y.S.
401, aff'd 176 App. Div. 885, 161 N.Y.S. 1143, (1916).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, Sec. 1 (1959), speaks of "act, neglect, or default."
Default has been interpreted in the following ways: "The omission or failure to
fulfill a duty, observe a promise, discharge an obligation, or perform an agreement," Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed.) at 505; "The non-performance of a duty,
whether arising under a contract or otherwise," Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Century
Ed., 1946) at 282; "Fault; neglect; omission; the failure of a party to an action
to appear when properly served with process; the failure to perform a duty or an
obligation; the failure of a person to pay money when due or when lawfully
demanded," Ballentine, Law Dictionary (1930) at 346.
26 Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 342 (1936) [federal statutes
giving a cause of action for the death of a merchant seaman.]
27 See, generally, Prosser, Torts, 478-486, 705-719 (2d ed., 1955); 5 Corbin,
Contracts, § 1019 (1951). The analogy of the guest statute may be illustrative.
Guest statutes, or common law decisions reaching the same result, usually provide
that the driver of a motor vehicle owes to his gratuitous passengers only a duty
to refrain from wilful and wanton negligence, while a driver who is compensated
by his passengers owes them a duty of reasonable care. While such a distinction is
imposed by law, it seems consistent to say that it is based on the contractual relation between the parties when payment is involved. Automobile Ins. Com., 1960,
Automobile Guest Laws Today, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 223 (1960).
28 Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential? 19 J. Air L. &
Com. 166, 317 (1952).
29 Many Legal Twists Govern Air Crash Claims, Business Week, Feb. 6, 1960,
pp. 64-65.

